Pyrrhonian strategy in Rorty's Mirror of Nature

Regarding Rorty let us quote from J.N. Mohanty's The possibility of transcendental philosophy (1985) p.59 :

Impressive as he is in his scholarship, he has given very few arguments of his own. He uses Sellars' arguments against the given and Quine's against meaning, as though they cannot be answered, but he has done little to show they cannot be. He plays one philosopher against the other, and would have one or both dismissed, according as it suits his predelineated moral. These are rhetorically effective but argumentatively poor techniques. What does it matter if Sellars rejects the concept of the given - one may equally rhetorically ask - if there are other good philosophers who accept the viability of that concept? There is also an implied historicist, argument that has little cutting edge. If the Cartesian concept of the mental had a historical genesis (who in fact ever wanted to say that any philosophical concept or philosophy itself did not have one?) whatever and however that origin may be, that fact is taken to imply  that there is something wrong about the concept.