Schematism involves the concepts of 'rule' and 'time', the realization of a pure concept of the understanding. How can we understand this but as computation ?
The difference between thinking something and knowing something. How can we explain this ?
The ideas of reason as ideal, completed totalities (the unconditioned). There is a largest set, because we can think of the set of all things and thus everything will belong to it. On the other hand if there is a set containing all things then this set itself must belong to it and as such will no longer be the largest set. Thus there is no largest set. Kant's anticipation of Russell's paradox. Kant is finitist and intuitionistic somewhat like Brouwer with his theory of choice-sequences.
The ideas of reason organize and give a direction to philosophy and science but they are also the foundation of practical morality. As we wrote previously: intelligence and morality are one.
In the transcendental dialectic in some cases Kant states that both opposing propositions are false in other cases that they are both true - this recalls the Buddhist tetralemma.
Reason as the intelligible character, the noumenic source of freedom.
Kant seems to be saying that the phenomenal self and the phenomenal world are mutually dependent and relative.
Grete Hermann: quantum mechanics does not disprove causality, but rather clarifies it by separating it from deterministic predictability. She proposed that while quantum predictions are statistical, causal chains can be reconstructed retrospectively after measurement.
A very important aspect of quantum mechanics is the relationship between the Schrödinger equation and the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (which originally expressed the analogy between mechanics and optics).
$\frac{\partial S}{\partial t} + H(p, \frac{\partial S }{\partial p} , t) = 0$
This relationship was present at the very beginning in multifaceted history of quantum theory. The Hamilton-Jacobi approach (beyond its use in quasi-classical approximation) is the key to developing a correct pilot-wave type theory (which does not necessarily have anything to do with Bohm's variant or path-integral approaches). Research on droplets bouncing on vibrating fluids (where the "droplet" both causes and is affected by the associated "wave") is of utmost interest and importance.
We have discussed the mutually implied trinity : logic, computation and arithmetic. But we should also add therein combinatorics and graph-theory...
The Curry-Howard isomorphism expresses to a certain extent the correspondence between logic and the $\lambda$-calculus presentation of computation. Different type-theoretic-logical systems (Gödel's system T, Girard's and Reynold's system F) only capture a fragment of the class of computable functions. Curiously enough there is also a direct correspondence with forms of Peano Arithmetic wherein provable totality is used to characterize such classes.
And what is a computational object but one which can be reduced, in which a computational process can be carried out ?
Given a (partial) formal model of computation does it always have some kind of "logical" correspondence? And vice-versa? Note how both proof and computation involve temporality in an essential way...
This is what we call Girard's problem: in the above, what is a priori and what is posteriori? what is analytic and what is synthetic?
Frege simply defined 'analytic' as that what is derivable in his system of second-order logic (and does not rely on any form of intuition). Girard seems to view untyped computational objects as analytic and typed-ones as synthetic. One notion of a proposition being analytic is: being true in virtue of its form alone.
Girard's linear logic and proof-nets (and geometry of interaction, transcendental syntax) seeks, so it seems, to delve deeper into the above correspondence, even going beyond the distinction between a proposition and its proof. Girard offers a computational model distinct from the $\lambda$-calculus and still connected to the essence of proof.