A point about subjective idealism

Consider the opening sentence of Schopenhauer's famous book: "Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung/The world is my representation".  How can subjective idealism seem at once so utterly certain and so dubious? The answer is quite simple and lies in the definite article "Die/the" in Schopenhauer's dictum. The world in the sense of the world in which each one of us is acquainted with through first-hand experience - my world that I take immediately as the world - this cannot be in reality any more than a modification of the subject, of consciousness, a self-projection, self-occultation of consciousness inside itself. Even from neuro-reductionist physicalist assumptions there is no way of avoiding this conclusion without dogmatism (the ruse of invoking the objectivity or public nature of logic or language) or non-physicalist explanations and we can turn Benaceraff's overrated objection against Platonism against the physicalist who wishes to refute subjective idealism:  basic neuro-physiology and gestalt psychology show that a direct causal connection between nerve impulses and the "causality" of the phenomenal subjectively constituted world - is sheer nonsense. There are physical impacts on receptors which do not produce effects on consciousness and there are effects on consciousness which are not the direct result of impacts on receptors.

The world in the sense of that world with which I am acquainted with through first-person experience, is entirely phenomenal and exists in consciousness only, despite its objectifying externalizing intentions and pretenses.  However from this it does not follow in the least that a world, any world, is my representation. It does not follow that outside my world there is not another world. Nor can we rule out that there could be some sort of cognizable connection between our world and such a world, the world which is not our world.  In Kantian terms there does not follow that there is no thing-in-itself and it does not follow that we cannot know anything about this thing-in-itself (we already know that we know that it does not necessary not exist).  Despite Kant's own arguments, we may hold that such a world-in-itself is perhaps a grey, timeless, purely mathematically structured world but in which other world-creating consciousness subsist. We can even discern such a conception in Hume's Treatise. None of our causal scientific theories or explanation depend on the phenomenal intuition or concept of time, only on a vicarious geometric abstraction, a flattened timeless time.

Consider the stereographic projection of a sphere into a plane. The sphere is the subject,  the tangent bundle of the sphere is the modifications of consciousness,  the plane is the postulated world outside consciousness.  

But is this not logical dogmatism where we endow logic, a product (or condition?) of consciousness, with the right to judge that which is beyond consciousness? If logic corresponds to the ability to understand, carry out and check rules and to meta-interpret rule-systems,  where resource constraints can be taken into account,  then perhaps continuous processes - as infinitary rule systems - transcend logic. But logic functions through necessary principles of meta-logical agreement - thus it is reasonable to endow logic with transcendental epistemic scope. If a derivation in one formal system has to be considered sufficient for the cognition of a non-finitary property of non-derivability in another formal system, then surely the belief in the extensive epistemic range of formal systems - of logic - is reasonable.

If the above considerations do not seem convincing, we can point out that the validity and transcendental scope of logic (the highest a priori condition) is an essential assumption in Hume (as we discussed in detail before), Kant, Schopenhauer and Husserl.  We can always ask Kant: what gives reason the right to judge itself and its own limits? Does not transcendental logic have to follow the rules of general logic as well (even if it includes important differences)?  And another important approach involves the formal verification principle: challenge the meaning-as-use ordinary language philosophers and neoscholastic dogmatists  to set up their theory of knowledge and mind in a formal system and then proceed to critique those systems using their own rules. The weak conclusion remains the same: either physicalism is false or (qualified) subjective idealism is true. The stronger conclusion is that if consciousness is essentially non-physical and non-local (or even trans-temporal) then this fact tends to strengthen rather than weaken the case for qualified subjective idealism. And if the dogmatists invoke a direct intuitive "given" or direct intuitive acquaintance with allegedly real exterior things then they have no right to discard the direct intuitions of consciousness being the fundamental reality that can be experienced during spiritual development and altered states of consciousness.

If we are certain that there are universal moral laws known a priori then it would seem to follow that we should treat phenomena which appear to us as being sentient beings as if they really were sentient beings (treat them according to the moral law),  regardless of the non-reality of their first-person phenomenal presentations. This is because we do not have nor could ever have certain knowledge that they do not exist (either entirely or in part) and secondarily because regardless of the situation the practice of moral deeds can only strengthen character and morality itself.  If a child is nice to its toys it will probably be nice to people and animals as well. The similarity of this argument to Pascal's wager is noted.

But subjective idealism is a misleading term because it suggest than an individual ego-subject, finite personality or self-in-the-world is at the same time some kind of substrate of the world. But in reality cosmo-ontology and egology are illusions to be dissolved together. This is the task of transcendental dissolving and liberating insight,  true philosophical phenomenism/positivism/empiricism and skeptical dialectics.

Also considerations on temporality, finitism, mereology, the mysterious nature of concepts and meaning - and in general intrinsic intentionality, synthesis, constitution and constructivity - applied to both the self and experience  - are quite sufficient to establish the above liberating insight with regard to the egological and cosmo-ontological illusion.

How do we interpret quantification from a finitist perspective? How can we develop intentionalist finitism? What does alleged arithmetic knowledge mean from a finitist perspective? Was Hilbert really defeated? Was Leibniz actually a finitist?  Can finitism offer new perspectives on the theory of knowledge? Can we solve the problem of the stubborn non-finitism of category theory? Do we need a new interpretation of Carnap and Russell?

Can statements about numbers involve an infinite number of relations to actual numbers? What is the significance of Ockham here? Can psychologism be revindicated?

The new synthetic a priori principle: finite derivations must ratify and represent an indefinite but bounded set of truths. This is applied also to specification and verification of programs.

And yet, what are logical, semantic, phenomenal, physical atoms? What could they be? Can paraconsistent and infinitary logic be justified in the framework of our "Analyticity, Computability and the A Priori"?

Genius, Intelligence and Sainthood

Schopenhauer expounds a theory of 'genius' in the World as Will and Representation. The analysis and critique of varied historical and present meanings of the terms 'genius', 'intelligence' and 'sainthood' in the west is of utmost cultural and philosophical importance. Part of our philosophical project involves the radical deconstruction of these concepts and unmasking their harmful influences and consequent aberrations. 'Sainthood'  is currently employed in a socio-historical sense or related to organized religions, its true universal ethical and spiritual meaning being lost.  'Intelligence' is a vague and fluid pseudo-concept that has wrought immeasurable harm to human culture and society as well as to the human sciences. The term 'genius' is as a rule completely misapplied.

Our theory of intelligence is that true intelligence is founded on two intimately connected principles. That of knowledge of the universal moral law (perceived as such) and that of attaining at least some elements of transcendental philosophical consciousness (TPC) and transcendental philosophical praxis (TPP).

Extraordinary achievements in TPC and TPP are the mark of genius par excellence. 

The genius of true intelligence in the ethical sphere and TPP is called 'sainthood'. 

The special kind of genius, that while intimately connected implicitly to morality, TPP and TPC (as brilliantly expounded by Schopenhauer),  is that of artistic genius which reveals fundamental important aspects about human nature and the world.  

The quality of intelligence is related directly to the importance of its object and domain. 

Intelligence can be defined as an empathy for reality and moral intelligence has as its main source universal empathy for the suffering of all living beings. 

Intelligence and morality are one. 

The extreme opposite of true intelligence is all that involves a kind of cunning, a skill-set whose only purpose and application lies in achieving personal egotistic wealth and power, everything that involves dominating, exploiting and harming other living beings. There is no 'intelligence' here, no 'genius' and no 'sainthood'. Intelligence is radically incompatible with the will to power or competitive mechanisms of survival (i.e. overpowering others or merely adapting to a contingent environment).

The greatest deception and idol of western society has been attributing 'intelligence' or 'genius' to what amounts to nothing more than gaming, gambling, cunning and calculation. We have to be extremely cautious and insightful about attributing intelligence or genius to work in logic, mathematics, engineering or science,

Genius and intelligence in mathematics is never about the predictable success (theorem proving) in random searches in formal possibility spaces and conceptual engineering (scientific mass production) but rests solely on the relevance of the work to philosophy (more specifically to TPC) and to the philosophical unification and clarification of science.

Playing the game, being lost in the illusion of the game, is very different from the TPC-informed insight and consciousness of the game qua game (which can be compared to the attitude of Alice at the end of Alice in Wonderland...and Schopenhauer uses the metaphor of the chessboard after the game is finished). 

Thus we have such unsurpassed luminaries as Gauss, Grassmann, Riemann, Frege (who wrote that every true mathematician is half a philosopher), Peirce, Hilbert, Turing, Whitehead, Gödel, Brouwer, Russell, Poincaré, Lawvere, Thom, Martin-Löf, Girard, etc. Their writings are never a mere tortuous game with symbols and ad hoc concepts or non-rigorous obfuscation and plagiarism. The light of TPC implicitly shines through. Their work is also a spiritualization of language.

But scientific discoveries with practical applications to the quality and preservation of human life (or of any living being) are certainly meritorious - for indeed they partake this way in the sainthood, intelligence and genius of ethics.  Science aimed at mechanisms for harm and destruction is the ultimate immorality and stupidity. There is nothing brilliant or intelligent about faulty simplistic models of human society such as 'game theory'.

Hegel and Metaphysics

We can trace much of Hegel back to Spinoza, Leibniz and Kant. But what if Spinoza and Leibniz themselves represented but an adaptation or even simplification of little known medieval philosophical  texts (much earlier than Böhme) ? And that such texts gave a firm foundation for the synthesis of Hegel with Schopenhauer? What if the unfolding of Hegel's Logic or Phenomenology of Spirit can be interpreted as representing the process of spiritual liberation, totalization  and harmonization of all states of being?

In the Zusätze to 573 of the Encyclopedia, we read:

If we want to see the consciousness of the One (...) in its finest purity and sublimity, we must consult the Mohammedans. If, e.g., in the excellent Jelaleddin−Rumi in particular, we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth, and that unity described as love, this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar, a transfiguration of the natural and the spiritual, in which the externalism and transitoriness of immediate nature, and of empirical secular spirit, is discarded and absorbed.

Essence becoming actuality in the Science of Logic: beyond different models for a theory, different frames of reference for physics, representations for an algebraic structure, etc. Do we not here have the phenomenological reflection which neither attempts to have empty thought grasp directly its own structure nor is thought loosing itself in the objectified engagement in its action, but rather is the self-reflected awareness of thought in its thinking, a shift of perspective which knows itself in its process?  This goes beyond causality, computation and formal logic to inner and infinite spiritual knowledge. Spiritual knowledge is knowledge that what is in consciousness is taken and proceed from its inmost center, a revelation, veiling-unveiling, which must pass to reveal the process: the revelation is re-velation.

Hegel's treatment of modality in the section of Actuality is very relevant to contemporary discussions on possible worlds and arguments against the world being a sum of independent contingent facts. There are also connections that could be made to modal logic (i.e. the connection between possibility, actuality and necessity and the axiom $\lozenge P \rightarrow \square \lozenge P$). 

The considerations on necessity and substance (and indeed the long digressions on Newtonian forces already suggest this) can be interpreted in terms of the solutions of differential equations (or in general smooth vector fields on a manifold). The local existence and uniqueness of a solution for a given initial conditions expresses determinism which extends to a global determinism. 

The first part of Schopenhauer's World as Will and Representation is divided into four books. It would be interesting to establish a correspondence with the Science of Logic.  Clearly books 1 and 2 correspond to Being and Essence while books 3 and 4 correspond to Concept. However books 1 and 2 are written from the perspective 'for us', from the point of view of transcendental reflection. From this perspective books 1 and 2 belong to Essence and their philosophical knowledge expresses with great rigor and detail Hegel's theory of appearance, existence, substance, necessity, causality and actuality.  Or maybe Hegelian substance is much like the spontaneous production and manifestation of the will in Schopenhauer. It goes beyond phenomena and appearance because the will is immanent in its manifestation, totally in each one and beyond any particular one. The will has to manifest. Transcendental reflection, artistic contemplation and spiritual development represent the will's progressive self-knowledge, return to self, the Hegelian Spirit in the form of the concept.

Category Theory: a category expresses essence. Each object is a different mode whose determination is inseparable from its relations (morphisms) to the whole (all possible determinations). An object is an expression of the category and yet not the category (for there are other objects). At the same time this circumstance of the object not being the category is itself internalized and expressed as the object being itself the sum-total of its relations (morphisms) with all other objects (i.e. with the totality of the category). This expressed also that the object is the category. 

The Concept can  be seen as arising when we have the cyclic transcendental consciousness of metatheory. That is to say: we realize that transcendental presuppositions are in cyclic dependency: to do logic we need computation, to do computation we need arithmetic and combinatorics, to these we in turn we need computation and logic. The germ of this in the reciprocal causality at the end of Essence (which we have also associated with higher groupoids). And also, as we have discussed in more detail everywhere, the partial (meta)reflection of one formal system by another (or the formal system by itself) is clearly relevant here: it is the idea of the whole being implicit to some extent in the part. For instance in ZF set theory itself we can prove that there are non-equivalent models of ZF.

The unknown Dharma of the West

Can we trace a continuous tradition from original Buddhism to Socrates to Plato and the Megarian school to Pyrrho to Sextus to Plotinus to Damascius to Pseudo-Dionysius ? As strange as this may seem to some, there are some striking arguments that can be made to support many links in this chain. In fact we are pleased to note that Sara Ahbel-Rappe in her edition of Damascius' Problems and Solutions concerning First Principles, makes a direct reference to Sextus. The Buddhism-Pyrrho link has been studied for instance by C.I. Beckwith's Greek Buddha (2015). It has also been argued (by C.M. Mazzucchi)  that the author of Pseudo-Dionysius was in fact Damascius who managed to inject core doctrines into the heart of the 'mystical'  tradition of Christianity (which has nothing to do with the literal sense of dogmas): and here we mean its better (predominantly medieval) manifestations such as Hadewijch, Porete, Eckhart, the author of the Cloud of Unknowing, the Viae Sion of Hugh of Balma (which we dedicated a small note to).  It is in this light that we would reinterpret Plato and the close connection to Socrates, Pyrrho and the Megarians.

'Spiritual realization' (we use this term temporarily) is not the same thing as psychotherapy (etymology aside). Psychotherapy aims at helping people adjust and balance personality traits so as to be at peace with themselves and the world around them.  It is about the constitution of an individual 'personality' and 'ego', often seen as the result of an integration of different tendencies or the product of past development and adaptation strategies.  Spiritual realization such as we outlined in our previous account of TPC and TPP more or less presupposes physical and mental health as a condition and its aim involves shining a light through self-hood and overcoming its underlying impulse, motives, determinations and limitations. But this does not rule out that it can also be highly beneficial in a psychotherapeutic context.

We are conscious of the present and the past in the form of recollected or anticipated mental content in the present. Past and future are mediated by the present and are indeed in the present. TPC involves awareness of the presentness of past and future directed or colored mental content. The theory of the 'present moment' and 'letting go of the past and future' and finding 'the timeless present moment' taught in many approaches to Buddhist meditation conceals something of huge psychological and philosophical depth and importance. Temporality is linked to the conditioning of the mind by thought, the constitution of the world by thought, and the falling away from TPC. Time is the magical stage of thought, the impermanence which is made permanent mixing perception and forgetfulness. We might say that this proper philosophical consciousness of psychological (inner) temporality is at the heart of TPC and TPP.  The same goes for self-identification, self-projection,  craving, repulsion.  But the aforementioned practices require the good fortune of being able to retreat to a secluded, quiet, safe and solitary place, the best option  being the countryside.

If we leave this world to attain another state of being we can at least control what we bring along to the next plane.  Let us not bring with us the least trace of anger, hatred, resentment, desire, attachment, clinging - or ignorance and delusion, specially delusion regarding identity and identification or the magic show of our own consciousness.

It is important to note that by 'buddhism' we mean the philosophy, psychology, ethics and spiritual practices that we interpret to be arguably and quite patently present in old Pali and Sanskrit texts (independently of the presence of elements of a different nature, textual history and corruption, etc.). Our meaning of this term does not depend in any way on any particular historical or cultural embodiment of buddhism and as such is not open to the common criticism that we are ignoring its cultural roots or merely picking certain elements which fit a pre-conceived agenda (we are not claiming to represent or interpret any concrete cultural buddhist tradition).  Also we are well aware that modern distorted abstractions and (mis)applications of buddhism can from a psychiatric point of view have harmful effects (cf. negative experiences with so-called 'mindfulness', vipassana and Goenka retreats, experiences which according to our interpretation have nothing to do with the buddhist spiritual path).

We would be quite happy to debate anyone on this topic. Also the focus on buddhism does not imply that we attach less value to the parallel traditions of the Upanishads, Yoga, Samkhya, Vedanta and so forth. 

It is quite possible that the philosophy of Schopenhauer (the philosophy of the principium rationis, the principium individuationis, the central role of voluntas, the theory of representatio, the theory of  supra-individual timeless, ubiquitous cognition,  etc.) offers some of the deepest and most important components of TPC and TPP. Schopenhauer claimed as ultimate source the Upanishads. In Schopenhauer all the sphere of manifest consciousness, individuality, identity, spatial and temporal limitation, conditioned by the Kantian intuitive and conceptual categories, is the product of a primordial impulse and energy.  The only way out of this prison is through a total reversal and repolarization of this fundamental impulse and energy which results in the 'involution' of all the modes, conditions and determinations of individualized consciousness and the consciousness-immanent world.

Also Schopenhauer might help us understand better what we wrote about the inner, first-person, experience of the body. 

One might entertain the idea that there is a far greater unity and affinity between Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer than is generally believed.  Shapshay has argued this with regards to the ethics of Kant and Schopenhauer. And beyond the personal animosity between Hegel and Schopenhauer it is quite possible that Hegel might furnish some valuable structural and interpretative enrichment of Schopenhauer and that Schopenhauer could provide the essential clarification, correction, deeper meaning and completion so lacking in Hegel.