A system of philosophy

In the past we have attempted to expound the methodology of what might be called a philosophical introspective psychology, while being careful to sharply delineate such a methodology from the better known and only superficially similar approaches of Husserl's phenomenology or other later forms of phenomenology.  We were also very careful show that it had very ancient and venerable historical roots and we payed particular attention to five Nikayas of Pali Buddhism, Sextus Empiricus and Hume's Treatise. Subsequently we will outline a universal historical methodology to detect its presence (we call this the "golden trunk") in the most diverse regions since prehistoric times (for instance, in the most precious core of the Upanishads, the Yoga system, the abhidhamma, the Yogacâra system,  Advaita Vedanta, etc.) as well as antagonistic doctrines (which are "dried leaves" separated from the life-giving energy of the golden trunk).

In addition, the essentially soteriological nature of this instrospective methodology likewise demarcated it from modern phenomenology and we used Plato's allegory of the Cave to illustrate a fundamental difference: we are not interested in gazing at the shadows even considered as shadows, but in gazing them qua shadows only in so far as it serves for us to go beyond the shadows. Another aspect is the presence of active forms of the cultivation of consciousness itself and the development of habits, but without these ever replacing or over-riding the fundamental role of philosophical introspective insight, analysis and deconstruction. The criterion to distinguish between true and false "knowledge systems", or between genuine spiritual-philosophical teachings and mere religions, cults and self-help psychologies is the fundamental role given to knowledge (vipassana, pañña, bodhah, jñana), to transcendental spiritual-philosophical introspective insight regarding consciousness (cf.  Shankara's Atma-Bodha, 2: sakshan-mokshaikasadhanam). By "false" we mean teachings and practices which simply do not work (the goal always remains illusory and far-off) or achieve partial results in problematic and mixed ways.

Philosophical instrospective psychology aims to lay bare (through deconstructive but not artificial or distorting analysis: vipassana, pañña) the contents of consciousness as such, more specifically, the universal flux of consciousness self-reflected as pure consciousness, pure givenness, at once totally present and totally manifesting the universal condition of temporality and transience (immanent impermanece which dissolves objectivity) and the temporal intentions of memory and anticipation - and also the deconstructive analysis of the illusion and sense of ego, subject or "self".  The awareness of the flux of cogitations purely as cogitations with their accompanying sense elements. This state of transcendental consciousness of the pure immanent self-awareness of consciousness is the supreme other-worldliness or non-worldliness, of disidentification and freedom. And yet we also acknowledge the semi-conscious aspect of much of this universal flux, its vague, fluctuating and even stochastic-selective nature, its aspect in which it blends and tangles together narratives and experiences from the past with anticipations of the future.  But philosophical introspective psychology is anchored in a soteriologial intention and thus this self-consciousness, this aim of self-transparency is also one of self-transcendence and universal abrogation of the directions (intentions) of the forces and energies of consciousness.  Thus there is a balance between analysis and detachment. The goal is moksha which can be described as absolute consciousness, a timeless, uniquitous state of infinite joy and oneness of infinite life. A foundational text for our system of philosophy is the brilliant book by Bhikkhu Nananânda: Concept and Reality. We could describe this philosophy as : illuminated introspective disidentifying philosophical psychology. A self-reflection of what is really there. True psychological introspection is transcendental: the self dissolves.

We left open many questions.  Is this philosophical introspective psychology a form of idealism? Or an extreme form of psychologism or solipsism? And a central problem: how do we develop from there  a theory of ethics based on compassion, a moral sense realism in the style of Shapshay's interpretation of Schopenhauer, more particularly, Schopenhauer's purely analytical and phenomenological work On the Basis of Morals?  More specifically, how do we develop a coherent account of "intelligence" wherein we can conclude categorically that intelligence and morality are one?

And perhaps the most challenging problems of all: how do we develop in this framework a systematic philosophy of logic, language and mathematics? Our theory is the we take not classical mathematics, but a special kind of legitimate consciousness-rooted mathematics as the common foundation (or more loosely, presupposition) for both logic and language. This Ur-mathematics flows directly from the fundamental dynamic proliferating aspects of consciousness (we associate the Pali concept of papañca with choice sequences and that of computation with the fundamental energy of the mind), and must be sharply distinguished from "classical" mathematics which historically, in its subsequent developments (such as in topos theory, modal logic or forcing), appropriated and perverted much of the original results and insights of Brouwer's (and other forms of) intuitionism. Logic and language considered as more exterior and contingent and heavily sociologically and psychologically conditioned and conditioning. Language is not "objective" but expresses states of cunning, greed, the desire of domination or states of oppression, ignorance and indoctrination. So-called linguistic "meaning" is entangled with the incoherent, semi-consciously conditioned, temporally directed, selective, and blended aspects of consciousness. In this respect there are some interesting connections to Gadamer and even Derrida as well a decolonialist thought. A complementary aspect involves a Pyrrhonic and deconstructivist reading of Hegel as an attack against objectivist, naturalist and anti-psychologist theories of language. 

And are traditional arguments against psychologism in need of reassessment? Was the psychologism attacked, for instance, by Frege and Husserl, a strawman? For instance van Atten thinks that "private language arguments" carry some weight against psychologism.  Do they hold against our introspective philosophical psychology?  Does Husserl conceal camouflaged objectivist dogma? Is Husserl's transcendental ego (and its intersubjectivity), completely lacking any soteriological dimension,  another form of objectivism and hypostatization of the Euro-centric colonialist gaze? Does not true intersubjectivity spring from freedom rather than law?  Our central thesis is that almost all of twentieth century philosophy (both anglo-american and continental) represents a profound error and a concerted effort - a socio-cultural and political agenda - to eradicate and discredit the purest forms of introspective philosophical psychology, and this took place of various parallel fronts from earlier "objectivist" anti-psychologist crusade in philosophy to universal and systematic behaviouristic and materialistic downplaying of consciousness and introspection in philosophy and psychology (and this is shared by post-modernism and critical theory). This tendency - the tyranny of exploitative language divorced from consciousness -  reaches its consummation with the advent of generative AI. Following Ernst Gellner's Words and Things we can produce simultaneously and independelty both an intrinsic critique and refutation of these anti-consciousness philosophies and a socio-historical analysis.