It is far from clear what exactly is the so-called 'scientific method' but it is clear that is actually a complex and fluid combination of various different methodologies and attitudes all of which are inextricably genealogically and logically connected to theoretical assumptions and hermeneutic decisions.
The scientific method conceived as the 'experimental method' pertains principally to a certain limited and partial domain of reality - that of 'matter' or 'physicality' or the strictly physical-chemical dimension and aspects of living beings - and as thus the kind of theory associated exclusively with it must be essentially an abstraction of reality (rather than a negation of other aspects of reality).
The experimental method is not logically or theoretically self-contained or self-justifying or self-sufficient (for instance it depends on previous theory, hermeneutics and mathematical theory). It has no claim to supremacy and exclusivity as far as a source of knowledge in its particular associated domain nor a fortiori claims regarding other domains of reality which it may well be totally inadequate for.
Also if the ultimate aim of physical science is the construction of machines that serve mankind and the good of the world or the development of treatments in medicine, then the kind of deep intuition which guides the engineer or medical doctor is just as important as any experimental protocol: for there is no greater proof or validation than the machine actually working or the treatment being actually effective.
Experimental science is not the only not the best or most certain or even most important source of knowledge (for instance there are the more certain, more important and more fundamental epistemic domains of logic, mathematics and ethics, all of which have nothing to do with physical experimentation). Nor does its particular limited domain of application exhaust the totality of reality. Nor can experimental science justify any kind of reduction or alleged correlation (supervenience) between its domain and other different domains. In fact the actual experimental results and evidence contradict such reductionist claims. Experimental science cannot a priori impose its epistemic methodology on other domains of reality - and much less claim that a physicalist philosophy is somehow justified by the experimental method itself or its results (which is factually false).
When natural science and the 'scientific method' violate basic ethical principles such as when causing harm, suffering and death to human beings or animals in the course of its methodology and 'experiments' , it shows itself to be profoundly mistaken and driven by the same kind of blind superstition, dogmatism and fanaticism it often projects onto and decries in others.
Spirit, soul, mind, consciousness - this is an entirely distinct domain of reality which cannot be reduced to and does not necessarily supervene on physical matter (the physical brain and body). There is no reason why the experimental method should be the best method (as opposed for instance to an axiomatic-deductive or first-person phenomenological and instrospective method - both of which were developed to high degree in Ancient Greece and India) for exploring and obtaining knowledge regarding this domain of reality.
And yet since spirit, soul, mind, consciousness are in a way connected to or associated with the physical brain and body it leaves indirectly its footprint in the legitimate domain of physical science. Thus it should be possible to additionally 'beat physicalism in its own domain', to exhibit tangible, measurable phenomena which even the most convinced physicalist could not deny.
This brings us to the subject called 'parapsychology'. On the surface this subject consists in certain experimental protocols which as a rule tend to lead to plausible conclusions or bring to light evidence which is radically at variance with a physicalist worldview, or to exhibit a class of phenomena that while involving the physical world suggests that there are forces at play which transcend it. So parapsychology while wearing the cloak of experimental science does patently have philosophical concerns.
There is the following major problem with parapsychological research. A massive amount of scientific activity has been funded with the goal of proving or finding evidence for physicalism (neural reductionism) or for various other theories which assume neuro-reductionist premises. A substantial and important part of parapsychological research should be devoted to a critical analysis of such experiments and their methodology and protocols showing how they completely fail to establish physicalist claims but rather strongly suggest opposite conclusions. Also parapsychology should point out that there is a massive amount of direct evidence (which was not obtained in a parapsychological context) suggesting the untenability of neuro-reductionist physicalism. There are also powerful theoretical deductions that can be made based on known neuroscientific facts (for instance regarding the impossibility of dendritic spines being involved in memory) which again refute physicalism. None of this involves 'spooky' phenomena and is perhaps not as 'fun' and 'exciting' as the usual concerns of parapsychology, and yet its importance and value is immense and fundamental.
While we hold that much of the experimental protocols and results in parapsychology are both valuable and interesting (specially the work of Rupert Sheldrake) it is a mistake to make such experiments and results a sole foundation for the rejection of physicalism (for there are much more powerful, extensive and conclusive arguments and evidence to be found elsewhere as discussed briefly above). Indeed it seems that as the rule the researchers in this field have still at least half-consciously profess a kind of confused semi-neuro-reductionism in which mind, consciousness and brain are too easily confused and conflated. This opens the door to a kind of theoretical neuroscience in which these phenomena could be explained by speculations pertaining to theoretical physics (for instance telepathy is compared to quantum entanglement). It becomes not about refuting neuron-reductionism but about exploring the quantum superpowers of the brain (or the interconnectivity of brains rather than primarily of consciousnessness).
Some other flaws we find in parapsychology are arguments from authority which also suggests a kind of implicit western supremacy and exceptionalism. For instance: person A was a great scientist and he or she thought parapsychology was a legitimate field of study therefore this counts as evidence that it is so. We have also seen it implied that a non-western person who undergoes a western academic education (or is involved in business) is somehow bound to be more intellectually honest (or less liable to deception) about paranormal phenomena than his counterpart who has not undergone such an education or training.
It also should be mentioned that in the past both in the east and west there was already a systematic science (first-person or axiomatic-deductive) involving the kind of phenomena (or powers) studied in parapsychology but with the caveat that no great spiritual importance was attached to them and they were rather seen as dangerous distractions and potential obstacles.
Finally we find it quite disturbing that the interest and use of parapsychology by government, military and intelligence agencies is mentioned - the military was interested in it and funded research in it, therefore this consists of evidence that there must be something to its claims (regarding, for instance, remote viewing) - all the while completely omitting to mention the terrible crimes and violations of human rights documented among such projects. This topic should first of all be mentioned as a cautionary tale that parapsychology can also be perverted and misused in criminal activities and that the aspiring parapsychologist must be wary of government and military funding and involvement.
Addendum to our note 'Differentiability, Computability and Beyond'. We wish to add some considerations to this note which also have some connection to experiments with random number generators and microPK. Recall that we postulated that a truly free particle must have a completely random completely discontinuous trajectory in space. This begets the problems: i) define this rigorously. ii) this trajectory is not unique but there are uncountably infinite many such trajectories and so there is no well-defined free state of a particle. And for i) we can draw inspiration from random number generators and the mathematical definitions used (this corresponds to the discrete case). Now in our note we considered that a field would act on this random particle in a certain way introducing a geometric form to its associated density or distribution. The similarity to the results in experiments involving random numbers generators is patent.
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