A new philosophy of science and technology

What are vague monster concepts ? They might be described as having a huge comprehension which hinders them being grasped as an intelligible whole so that one is inevitably lead to form a subconcept of which important aspects are missing (we could call such concepts 'quantum' or even 'fractal' in the Baudrillardian sense). This allows a rhetoric of the concept which can pragmatically justify opposing statements according to circumstance (in the theory of Thom, it is almost if it were alive and had developed a sort of self-defense mechanism).  It also invites the questioning of whether the concept as a whole represents anything consistent and intelligible  beyond being merely a cloud, a manipulate veil for power and control.  Western culture abounds in monster concepts. We mentioned 'religion'. Another concept is 'intelligence' though this is also a the same time a pseudo-concept.  Relatedly, what we discuss in this post is the western monster concept of  'science'. 

In a nutshell: there are really only two species of authentic  'science': the science of consciousness, the philosophical psychology we have discussed previously,  and  the 'science'  (which we call welfare engineering, a primary example being medicine) whose primary goal is lessening the suffering and improving the lives not only of human beings but of all life (ethically guided medicine and engineering).   Human beings love to explore and travel and discover new worlds, and science can furnish the tools and vehicles for doing this but this tendency and activity in itself is not science, it is what science can serve.   Now purely theoretical and formal 'science' that abstracts from the conditions and needs of human beings and other living beings on this planet - and which is not concerned with the phenomenology of consciousness and psychotherapy -  has been vastly overrated, over-prized, overvalued as have the so-called abilities and achievements in it (there is a noted tendency for so-called 'brilliant' theoreticians to be notably stupid, ignorant, bigoted (if not immoral) outside the narrow compartment of their professional interests ).  It has it roots in ancient Greece in which beyond medicine welfare engineering was largely non-existent (before Archimedes and the Hellenistic era; however in an interesting passage Aristotle envisions the idea of tools which work by themselves).  And more importantly theoretical science,  the idea that man obtains fulfillment through an external knowledge which has no bearing on the welfare and life of living beings or any connection to the direct  phenomenological self-knowledge of consciousness aiming at personal liberation, clearly has its template in medieval scholasticism and the particular kind of historical, organized and revealed religion it served.  A whole new paradigm for the development of welfare engineering needs to be developed which emphasizes  collaboration and purges research from ulterior motives based on financial, social and personal gain as well as the poisonous ideology of competition and struggle or the domination of the gambling conman entrepreneur. There is also a vast new field of the archaeology of welfare engineering with regards to its presence in various historical cultures (even if not in a conscious conceptual form).

There is a structural analogy between philosophical psychology and welfare engineering; the Pali suttas abound with Indian medical terms and there is likewise a connection between ancient Greek medicine (where experimental and empirical methodology was present) and both Pyrrhonism and Stoicism.

Now there are two objections that easily present themselves:

i) cannot engineering and even medical research be used equally for immoral ends and for great harm ? How about advances in medicine which involve experimentation of animals ?  Or in general what about the misuse of engineering for the power and profit of a human group causing great harm to other human beings, animals and the environment ? So  why use the term 'welfare engineering' ?  

ii) does not progress in applied science, in engineering and medicine depend crucially on theoretical science and even on mathematics ?

iii) are you not espousing a kind of pragmatism for natural science which contradicts what Aristotle wrote in the beginning of the Metaphysics: all men have by nature the desire to know ? 

We will address i) in a future post (the pragmatism of engineering makes manifest its essential link to ethics and human consciousness, contrary to the cold hypocrisy of purely theoretical science)   ii) is easy to answer. The fact of the matter is that the extent and depth of the purely theoretical and mathematical underpinnings of much of medicine and engineering have been grossly and drastically exaggerated.  Rather the legitimate and modest theoretical and formal apparatuses emerge naturally through the context of experimental feedback. It is as if somehow nature needed to say something and she somehow manages to say it in the most succinct and practical form, contrary to the shadowy, artificial and sickly proliferations of the theoreticians. The legitimate theoretical should be a tool for a tool, or rather a tool that should be designed to best operate on the tools of engineering.  As for iii) this ideal of pure knowledge is found in philosophical psychology. And Aristotle can be considered (despite the presence in his work of material of a different nature) the founder of the monster of a purely theoretical and formal science divorced from engineering and welfare and divorced from a science of consciousness and phenomenology.  His theoretical science held back progress in applied and experimental science for centuries and helped justify misogyny, racism and colonialism. 

We have seen how logic, arithmetic, computability, games and combinatorics form a closed interdependent circle (thus there is no reason to postulate the primacy of the 'logic' component, i.e. the one based on language) and how authentic logics come in families, the members of which mirror each other.  We have also seen how philosophical psychology espouses ontological pluralism and thus, without sacrificing the deep truths of phenomenism, phenomenology and the self-reflection and self-introspection of consciousness,  freely postulates the existence of a physical universe as well as a multitude of poles of conscious experience. Thus we can speak of an implicit 'order of the world' which encompasses both domains of consciousness experience and domains of physical existence as well as their relationship.  Logic is about bringing to light  the implicit unconscious order (which is also the order of the world and thus linked to praxis) of aspects of conscious thought, and as thus its task is always incomplete, its achievements partial. Logic is revealed in the structure and dynamics of the living activity of authentic science, there is no armchair logic.

Our philosophical methodology

It is a tendency for a structure which has found some partial practical use in a given context and situation to be extrapolated and applied to other situations and regions as well. In fact such a structure can become a preconceived category and part of a projected ontological system with claims of furnishing a more general  understanding of reality.  Contrary to what we have suggested previously it is extremely dubious that  common formal systems can have much direct relevance to our project of a philosophical psychology, that is, the project of recovering the first-person introspective science that had many remarkable developments in the 19th century (many of which appear in Husserl's Logical Investigations) and which later was tragically and wrongfully rejected or neglected (including by a hugely pretentious and destructive current of philosophy whose sole novelty was repeating obvious facts about language found in Saussure). We have discussed some important aspect of the project in previous posts, for instance how it should not be confused with subjective idealism and also the view adopted on the subject, the body and the physical world. The method pertaining to formal abstract research is completely distinct from that of such a philosophical psychology and indeed is antagonistic to it. The method required actually has more similarity with that of experimental science (cf. Hume's 'experimental method of reasoning') though obviously should not be confused with it.  Abstract formal concepts and methods should only come in after substantial progress has been made in philosophical psychology.  After pure introspective insight and knowledge has been gained (as explained before, it involves the detached awareness of the stream of inner verbal discourse and imagination, divided into its sensual species and their web,  perceived in its conceptual dimension as well and as proceeding from a fundamental process of identification), then through reminiscence the philosopher may be able to return and attempt to articulate this knowledge in the language of abstract formal computable systems (maybe the systems of consciousness has some similarity to the design of operating systems, themselves based on human social structure). Until then, natural language remains an imperfect but still amazingly flexible and serviceable tool. An analogy might be used from software development: first we must have a global systems theoretic intuition and idea of how the program is to be structured and work and then can be begin its concrete coding in a given language and platform. Or rather: first we must explore and view and know the mind first-hand and only afterwards can we use  known concrete systems  as tools or language to present an approximative model of the mind.  

It might be a very good thing to dissipate misunderstandings and distortions which would confuse this first-personal introspective methodology with that of psychoanalysis (i.e. Jung's analytic psychology), its theory of the unconscious and its proposed methods of exploration of the latter,  or with the method of the later of Husserl (we have in fact already discussed this in previous posts).  The problem with Jung revolves around the term 'religion'.  This is a large 'monster' vague concept which is incapable of definition and many partial, idealized and artificial aspects have been historically abstracted (or sanitized) to suit particular scientific, historical and philosophical theories. A question is: do we find in Jung the strange idea that religious beliefs, practices and narratives should be regarded as potentially psychological beneficial and therapeutic regardless of their objective historical, scientific, ethical and even social value and consequence ? Can we say that Jung diagnosed the modern age with 'lack of religion' and that he proposed a suitably adapted 'religion' as a cure  ? (the problem with Noll's famous book is that is mixes important factual material with more-or-less obvious intrusions of their author's own anthropological and historical ideology).  Or is the concept of 'religion' used by Jung a rather artificial idealized one that would lump together fundamentally heterogeneous things ? If the lover, the poet and all art involving creative imagination are interpreted as 'religious'  then this is clearly a very different sense of the term than the usual 'theological' and 'ecclesiastic' one (even if we take into account Hegel's lucubrations about the  'religion of art' of the Greeks and the similar Hellenism in the writings of Heidegger).  And what about 'initiatic' societies like Freemasonry ? And Jung's practice of analytic psychology itself ? For now we will pull out from the huge vague term 'religion' a single negative aspect (which links it strongly to the term 'cult') : that of passivity, surrender and dependence on a leader or group - in which is involved passivity with regards to aspects and manifestations of one's own psyche which cause lack of cognitive clarity and calm.  Passivity is of course a very difficult and complex term when applied to consciousness and in Pali buddhism 'passive' (in the sense usually translated as 'letting go' or 'detachment')  and 'active' aspects are combined in subtle and powerful ways.  Jung is  wrong in making an analogy between an alleged western 'extrovert' tendency to dominate the world and an eastern 'introvert'  tendency to dominate the psyche.  There is very little analogy between western material domination and the goal of original Buddhism which is ultimately not any kind of  'control' and 'domination': rather its mottos are know thyself and cure thyself.  An obvious enormous difference between our philosophical psychology and Jung is that imagination, dreams, symbols. images, myths etc. play a central role for Jung (and note the absurd importance allocated to 'gender' in  Jungian myths,  why cannot the sun be considered feminine as in ancient Japan, ancient Germanic and many other cultures ? ).  And such things are indeed found both in the original Pali texts and in Platonism - but what is really important is their function and attitude that is displayed towards them therein - and such function and attitude is quite different in Tibetan Buddhism (Jung was a keen reader of the Bardö Thodöl, though his personal library also included the editions of the Pali text society). Jung's interesting remarks on the salvation of the gods in Buddhism applies to Tibetan Buddhism. 

A very disturbing aspect of Jung (and Noll certainly identified this)  is that his ideas appear bound up with a kind of religious, cultural and even 'racial' conservatism, traditionalism which Noll amply elaborates on in function of  'völkisch'  blood-and-soil ideologies.  We find this aspect of Jung shallow, completely mistaken and  harmful, as is the theory of 'psychological types' applied to individuals and a fortiori to human groups such as the division between East and West or the imbecile pseudo-scientific theory of  races or cultures that could be 'aryan' and 'semitic',  terms only having meaning as linguistic classifications. Was Jung somehow ignorant that the ancestors of the most of the population of the Germany of his times consisted in a great portion of speakers of  Latin, Baltic, West Slavonic and Celtic alongside Germanic languages ?

Contrary to Jung we claim that cultural material that is factually erroneous, immoral and which causes psychological harm to oneself and to others,  does not deserve the slightest reverence or respect just for being 'tradition'  or being associated with one's ancestors or country. And that this certainly cannot be a positive basis for psychological and spiritual progress or self-knowledge. At worst it can be represent a kind of generational trauma - the 'collective unconscious' should be viewed as containing very negative things as well, things that were consciously imprinted through the ages by religious authorities and their brainwashing .  Even on the historical plane so-called 'traditions' reveal themselves not to be continuous traditions at all, but materially triumphing aspects of a rugged process of bloody and ideological conflict with other equally historically legitimate 'traditions' which happen to have lost through many disparate circumstances and factors.

 What is truly rooted in our essence and represents our spiritual continuity, is the spirit of questioning, criticism, evaluation and potential liberation from all 'tradition', both the social-cultural structure of  the waking world and from all contingent  negative unconscious influence (which Jung would essentialize). Foucault, Guattari and Deleuze correctly hold that the true revolutionary spirit is as much about self-transformation as social transformation, but fall into error in not acknowledging that this spirit is itself a continuous and ancient tradition.

Maybe the 'collective unconscious'   of a given social group does not emerge according some dubious speculation about man's prehistory,  but is rather largely the product of the conscious creative power of special individuals.  Jung himself made a curious remark that India was not up to what the Buddha wanted to reveal and teach. 

And yet Jung's whole theory of the collective unconscious might be seen as a subtle form of neo-Christian apologetics based on psychological suggestion and scientific sounding terminology (including popular racist myths) with some striking parallels to the objectives of the fiction of Tolkien, C.S. Lewis and other Inklings.

Contrary to Jung, we have argued extensively for the profound affinity - even almost identity - between the philosophy and spirit of original Pali Buddhism and that of ancient Greek philosophy, and this correspondence and affinity certainly extends to later Buddhist philosophy and later modern Western philosophy as well. Thus we can say that original Pali Buddhism (and not Christian gnosticism or alchemy) represents to lost soul, essence and root of what is best in Western humanity, provided we pay special attention to its knowledge of the universality and unconditionality of the duty of compassion and non-harm with regards to all human beings and animals. The collective unconscious of Western humanity itself needs to be healed and regenerated in the pure life-giving waters of the critical and revolutionary spirit at once new and ancient.  A very important aspect involves the study and investigations of ancient Europe (and its links to Druidism, ancient Greece and the regions in which original Buddhism developed) and the dispelling once and for all of the harmful myths or partial truths regarding our ancestors which are patent in Jung . The furor Teutonicus, the cult of *Wōðanaz  are unoriginal foreign elements borrowed from the warlike tribal gods of the Eurasian steppe nomads as patent from Beckwith's extensive book on the Silk Road; on the other hand the seeresses and prophetesses of some Germanic tribes as recounted by Roman historians were actually Druidic. We attach great importance to the proof of the historical, cultural and philosophical affinity and continuity between Greco-Roman antiquity and ancient Celtic speakers. Many of the Germanic speaking tribes seems to have been at the cross-roads between the Buddhist-Greco-Roman-Celtic light of humanity and civilization and the shamanic war-god and war-retinue culture (i.e. Spartan Thrasymachus-type  might-makes-right proto-Nietzscheanism) of the Eurasian steppes (which refutes the nonsensical theory of an  'Indo-European'  religion). In the territory of what is now Germany there is an powerful substrate of Western Slavs and Balts which may be associated to manifestations of higher philosophy and spirituality in Germany.

Tossing Algebraic Flowers down the Great Divide (contains extensive bibliography of the papers of Joseph Goguen)

 https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~goguen/pps/tcs97.pdf

We are working on a github repo with the collected papers of Goguen (just as has already been done for Lawvere).

In the 21st century among the 'algebraic flowers'  (in Goguen's sense of post-structuralist structuralism embodied in the applications of category theoretic and algebraic models in computer science to cognitive science, concept analysis,  cognitive linguistics  and other human sciences) we can include also  topos theory (see Olivia Caramello, Ontologies, knowledge representations and Grothendieck toposes, joint talk with Laurent Lafforgue) , homotopy theory (and higher category theory in general) and homotopy type theory.  Voevodsky constructed a model for dependent type theory based on simplicial sets. William Troiani wrote a master's thesis about 'Simplicial Sets are Algorithms'.

We took a look at the slides of Olivia Caramello's talk Ontologies, knowledge representations and Grothendieck toposes. The very interesting philosophical interpretation given to classifying toposes is good reason to investigate her work more closely. Along the way there occurred some research ideas:

i) Does the correspondence between geometric theories and classifying toposes form an institution (in the sense of Joseph Goguen) ?
ii) Can the concept of the classifying topos of a theory be extended to theories with models in non-grothendieck toposes such as the realizability topos ?
iii) Can we characterize theories whose syntactic toposes have a (non-trivial) structure of a triangulated category and more generally can we say more about the relevance of cohomology to logic ?

On the philosophical side: Consider our paper on the concept of continuity in Aristotle. Aristotle does not view space as being constituted by points, rather his notion is closer to that of a locale or a site. In an unpublished note we suggested that Aristotle's theory of the dependence between space, time and motion could be modeled with functors between sites and that the 'continuity' of motion is expressed by these functors preserving covers. We think it is fascinating that cover preserving functors appear also in the treatment of categorical logic.

On the mutual interpretation between category theory and Hegel's science of logic (which is inspired by, but also distinct from, that of Lawvere and the material available on this subject on nlab).   For the section on Essence (Wesen) we have some considerations on modern physics, specially relativity and gauge transformations,  but we find that this philosophy of classifying toposes as bridges provides to be the best interpretation of Essence vs. Appearance and the idea of a unifying conceptual system.

From cognitive science through category theory to philosophy and psychotherapy

We seek a satisfactory philosophy of mind based fundamentally on first-person introspection (on consciousness itself) which includes likewise a theory of concepts and language based on meaning and consciousness (but which nevertheless is an open ontological pluralism, rather than a strict subjective idealism).  The organization of semantic memory will play an important role.  We find that there is much valuable material found for this project to be found in the selection from work in cognitive psychology (with an important component of Gestalt psychology) expounded by John Sowa in his book Conceptual Structures. This work extends and consolidates many important past philosophical traditions.

However such a philosophy of mind has much to gain (methodologically) from the framework of general systems theory and specially from its embodiment in computer science - all this without emplying per se any kind of (neuro)physicalist reductionism/parallelism/functionalism.  But category theoretic methods should play a central role in a truly scientific and philosophical general systems theory and computer science based approach to cognitive psychology and specially a theory of concepts and language.  Foundational to this project is the work of Joseph Goguen and William Lawvere. Thus for example we attach great importance to categorical approaches to type theory, to institutions and Goguen's systems theoretic applications of sheaf theory (and hence topos theory).  It is also interesting to explore the applicability of higher category theory and monoidal categories (which has an elegant application to quantum security protocols).  Higher category theory and homotopy theory emerge naturally from ordinary category theory (cf. there is a canonical model structure on the category of small categories: the homotopy category makes equivalences of categories actual category theoretic isomorphisms, that is, we are considering the category of structures).  A vital aspect of category theory is that it allows to capture simultaneously the bottom up and top down aspects of complex concurrent systems - important both in the study of consciousness and in computer systems (machine code vs. high-level languages). A problem with category theory is its dependency on the category of sets, something that is not really overcome in enriched category theory, higher category theory, internal category theory, etc.

But this categorical systems theoretic approach based on cognitive science is essentially a first-person intuitive introspective approach to psychology and the philosophy of mind and a continuation of a rich philosophical heritage.  Its ultimate aim is soteriological (or psychotherapeutical)  and identical in spirit and goal to original Buddhism:  it is by direct scientific knowledge of consciousness that we are led to be able to let go and be free.  However the psychology which can be found in the earliest substrate of the Pali canon which has been meticulously studied by Sue Hamilton in her 1995 book Identity and Experience is difficult to grasp due to its laconic incompleteness and many fundamental terms are used in different ways depending on context.  It is clear that it is the spirit and meaning which was essential and that a more complete and thorough first-person based psychology was achieved  by practitioners of the various buddhist traditions throughout the centuries and by the best insights and work of the western tradition of philosophy and psychology. 

The expressions 'living in the moment', 'mindfulness' and those involving the 'now' have made their way into popular discourse. However these are very superficial and distorted ways of looking at some profound philosophical and scientific truths regarding consciousness: that the flow of consciousness includes the concurrency and interrelated streams of inner verbal discourse and inner visual imagination together with associated feelings and desire, all in complex feedback. This flow of consciousness is at the same time a kind of directed dynamic deployment of the storehouse of our network of concepts. Becoming progressively aware of this flux as it is nakedly in itself and observing it in a progressively detached manner - leads to its eventual cessation or transfiguration (inner silence, inner emptyness) into a timeless beautiful present.  This awareness extends to a deeper level, to the fundamental structure and dynamics behind the whole process of consciousness - and it is this that is to be the primary object (this shows the subtle but profound difference from standard phenomenology).  The whole process and field of consciousness is perceived to be the result of a certain direction and distortion at this fundamental level - something which is also reversible by focused attention and practice.

The nature of this detached and happy consciousness is not necessarily either that of a 'subject'  or a 'soul' in the rationalist and scholastic sense (which, be it noted, is quite a distinct conception from neoplatonic and even original aristotelian theory). The power over one's own mind is completely heterodox and is incommensurable with social power dynamics, in fact, this power is precisely the renunciation of all will of domination over others.

Our project employs a methodological neutrality or epokhê (cf. the ontological pluralism) and aims to be essentially a science of consciousness as  it appears and is in itself and not a form of subjective or absolute idealism, philosophy of nature, metaphysics or theology.  However we are radically opposed to and dedicated to the refutation of any form of psychology or philosophy of mind that rejects the foundational role of first-person conscious experience and any linguistic theory or philosophy of language which rejects the fundamental role of consciously apprehended meaning and its connection to concepts (see A. Wierzbicka's Semantic Primes and Universals for an account of the situation of much of 20th century linguistics); like Sowa we understand that there can be complex conceptual yet non-linguistic thought. It is precisely the rejection of consciousness or its essential nature or innate dimensions which is the true foundation of historical oppression, domination and totalitarianism.

Later on we will discuss the deep connection to ethics and how our approach involves a knowledge of the unity of consciousness and thus of physically separated /individuated consciousnesses.

We will discuss later how are approach relates to theories of symbolism and dream interpretation. 

And the unethical and deceptive character of those who write mathematics books which are not dedicated to clarity, precision and respect for the reader.

There are Mahâyâna sutras which suggest a higher 'physics' of consciousness analogous to modern 'unified theories' such as quantum gravity, supersymmetry, string theory, etc. but we are unable to say more about this at the moment. And indeed the natural (non-conscious) universe may be analogous to the conscious experience of some 'cosmic mind'  which in turn may be associated to some unknown super-natural universe. The kind of idealism this involves might be thought of the 'greater mysteries' and we are not concerned with it in this blog.

The truth of phenomenism and subjective idealism does not contradict the existence of a physical realm, only that this realm, the more it is considered in its pure objectivity, as it is in itself independent and distinct from our psychological (mis)representations, the less it can be considered a cause of suffering: what causes suffering is the naive realism of the projections and ontology of our own mental life (its fabrications and drama it stirs up  and constructs out of impersonal mathematically discrete non-sensual sense data). Likewise the existence of other poles of psychological experience outside ourselves is not rejected. Though consciousness and the physical can influence each other, each is what it is in itself and no other, the alleged physical in and by and of the mental is really just the mental, nothing more: the mental is in reality just the mental, not a world, and the physical is just the physical, not what the mental takes it to be (later on we shall touch upon how this relates to the problem of truth, certainty and a priori knowledge).

In desire there is both the constituted desiring subject as well as the constituted desired object. It is a great mistake to only concentrate on the constitution of the object and thereby to falsely hypostatize the desiring subject as a kind of substrate. Rather the two are bound up and raveled together; to entangle oneself from one means entangling oneself from the other.

List of my papers and writings (published or available online)

Category Theory  

M. Clarence Protin, Pedro Resende, Quantales of open groupoids. J. Noncommut. Geom. 6 (2012), no. 2, pp. 199–247

Logic and Type Theory

M. Clarence Protin, Type inhabitation of atomic polymorphism is undecidable, Journal of Logic and Computation, Volume 31, Issue 2, March 2021, Pages 416–425, https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exaa090

M. Clarence Protin ; Gilda Ferreira - Typability and Type Inference in Atomic Polymorphism, lmcs:7417 - Logical Methods in Computer Science, August 12, 2022, Volume 18, Issue 3 - https://doi.org/10.46298/lmcs-18(3:22)2022

Combinatory Intensional Logic: Formal foundations

 
On the Various Translations between Classical, Intuitionistic and Linear Logic (with P. Oliva e G. Ferreira), Ann. Pure and App. Logic (2025)

Introduction to Pylog

 

Philosophy of Logic and Language

 (This is one of my main interests: see most posts in the present blog Philosophical Monologues)

On proper names, sense and self-reference. Constructivist Foundations 20(2): 82–84. https://constructivist.info/20/2/082

On Analyticity and the A Priori

Inquiry into the nature of Kant's Logic in the CPR

Aristotle's Organon 

Protin, C. L. (2022). A Logic for Aristotle’s Modal Syllogistic. History and Philosophy of Logic, 44(3), 225–246. https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2022.2107382

Modern Definition and Ancient Definition

Aristotle's Second-Order Logic


History and Philosophy of Topology


Clarence Lewis Protin, Modern incarnations of the Aristotelian concepts of Continuum and Topos, in Intentio Nº 4 (2024), ISSN : 2679–4462, ISBN : 978–2–494988–03–3.

Hegel and Modern Topology


Stoicism


Commentary on Bobzien and Shogry's Stoic Logic and Multiple Generality

Stoic Logic and Dependent Type Theory

Philosophy of Epictetus 

Pali Buddhism and Western philosophy


Aristotle's Analysis of Consciousness and Pali Buddhism

Hegel

Commentary on the section on Verstellung in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit

Philosophical General Systems Theory

What is a System ?

Systems Theory

Some topics in the philosophy of nature (draft for the article below)

Differential models, computability and beyond

Ethics, political philosophy, history and anthropology