Thursday, June 6, 2024

Cognition and States of Consciousness

Husserl wanted us to develop a state of consciousness which also, of course, has a cognitive aspect - indeed the cognitive aspect might be seen as its raison d'être. But it is more than this. A state of consciousness implies a permanent habit, a transformation of character. Both Husserl and the oldest Buddhist texts dwell on (analytic) insight, disidentification, suspension and distancing (abgeschiedenheit).

If conscious experience is normally present in unreflected 'globs' , the goal of analytic insight is to unmask and be continuously aware of the ternary structure present in consciousness $\bullet \rightarrow \bullet$ and its subsequent higher-order unfoldings.

We mentioned before the archetypal structures and processes of consciousness. Here is an incomplete tentative list (with an implicitly Kantian basis):

Synthesis - gluing, covers, the sheaf-condition = extensibility on $j$-dense objects for a topos with a Joyal-Tierney topology.

               - different orders of wholes (higher groupoids)

Self-reflection - a system which can represent (partially at least) higher order aspects of itself within itself.  This is the original synthetic unity of apperception = I know that I am knowing. This is found in recursive definitions, inductive types, the successive powers of the $\lambda$-cube wherein external aspects of the system become internalized and internally represented, also the subobject classifier, truth-value object $\Omega$ in a topos. See also our post on the meaning of the logical connectives.

Return-to-self, that is, Kant's trinary structure in the CPR.  This is related to the negation of the negation, double negation as the third (synthesis).  In topos theory this relates to the dense topology and in particular to forcing.  The idea is simple. In rough terms it is as follows: consider $U\Vdash\phi$ as signifying that the sentence $\phi$ holds in region $U$. We define $U \Vdash \neg \phi$ if $\phi$ does not hold on any subregion $V\subset U$.  Then $U\Vdash \neg\neg \phi$ means that for any subregion $V\subset U$ we choose we must have that there exists a $W\subset V$ such that $W\Vdash \phi$.

Double-negation can also be connected to temporality: something must pass to reveal itself, ti to einai, quod quid erat.

But this is assuming a static consciousness, a fixed state of consciousness with its corresponding archetypal structures and processes. But what about the transformation into other states (such as found in Schopenhauer and Hegel) ? Do the archetypes change ? Or must we find further higher-level archetypes that govern and characterize this transformation ? To self-reflection we should add self-negation and self-transcendence whereby the correlative self of consciousness is abrogated and transposed to more universal and wide-encompassing modalities and states. 

Kant also had a Leibnizean dream, a complete axiomatic-deductive system of the pure a priori concepts and principles of the understanding. What is not clear is how he envisioned deduction and the interplay of the analytic and the synthetic.  Could the synthetic be exhausted in a finite set of axioms and all the rest be entirely analytic, Frege-style ? How could Kant explain that in mathematics there is often a convergence between intuition and formal deduction ? 

The history of transcendental idealism is yet to be written, specially as regards to the time between Kant and Husserl. Schopenhauer, Von Hartmann and Spir are far more important than Fichte or even Schelling. Tolstoy wrote of Spir: "reading Thought and Reality has been a great joy for me. I do not know a philosopher so profound and at the same time so precise, I mean scientific, accepting only what is strictly necessary and clear for everybody. I am sure that his doctrine will be understood and appreciated as it deserves and that the destiny of his work will be similar to that of Schopenhauer, who became known and admired only after his death". 

We can view Husserl' transcendental subjective idealism and Fregean-Leibnizean objective platonism as not mutually opposing by complementary or at least compatible. Also these two need not be considered exhaustive of reality,  as an important place should be given to ethics, to philosophy of art and to naturphilosophie and above all the practice and psychological basis of meditation (higher ethics).

2 comments:

  1. While Hegel's Logic is not without value we must not neglect to go back first to its ultimate sources in Kant's CPR and Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre and thoroughly analyse and explore them.

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  2. A neoplatonic interpretation of these considerations is also possible. Quite some time ago we wrote a few notes arguing that many key concepts of German idealism are already found not only in Neoplatonism (and Augustine) but also in Aristotle's De Anima.

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