Relevant logic and Aristotelic predicabilia

Relevant logic is concerned with logical concequence $\phi \vdash \psi$ but many of its aspects would seem to be transposable (or at least similar) to the conditions imposed on the predication of genus, definition and property in Aristotle's Topics. Co-extensionality (or "convertability") is a necessary but far from sufficient condition for a term $B$ to be the property (idion) or definition of $A$. For the non-redundancy, non-circularity and minimality conditions involved see our previous posts. Relevance obviously has a pragmatic dimension and can be analysed from this perspective (being careful to avoid naive materialist assumptions about the human mind). For example, for Aristotle the property $B$ must be better known than the term $A$ of which it is  a property of - this is of course rather 'pragmatic'.  But let us consider other conditions.  Repetition of the definiendum is ruled out in predication of essence (definition or genus). "What is a man ?  A man." would not be accepted just as $A\vdash A$ is not accepted in relevance logic.   Also "What is that ? It is an animal and it is an animal" would be rejected. In fact, it would seem that Aristotle tried to rule out all irrelevant information from predication of property, definition or genus.  Another example of repetition, irrelevancy and redundancy: "a rational animal that is an animal".  The idion is like a sign, a token, an indicator: "Since I heard laughing, I knew somebody was there." Thus idion and essential predication presuppose: awareness of the common knowledge between the two speakers - for the Topics, we must not forget, is essentially dialectical - and hence pragmatical with an awareness of a gradation between concepts and the undesirability of spurious and irrelevant content. The 'better known' is of course further developed by Aristotle as he distinguished between things better known to us and things better known in themselves . It is not necessarily pragmatic and social, it could follow from some measure of semantic or logical complexity or density of the concepts themselves. For Aristotle property is given for the sake of learning tou mathein kharin 131a.