Is philosophy dead ? And why ?

Fake 'skepticism' is worse than  explicit 'dogmatism', in fact, it is the worst kind of dogmatism. Fake skepticism gives the appearance of openness, open debate, discussion, dissent, pluralism,  by frenzily moving around and nitpicking a few leaves and twigs (often employing very important sounding terminology) while leaving the root, trunk and main branches tacitly and implicitly unquestioned, unexamined, untouched - as if the implicit acceptance of this system of dogmas and the peculiar patterns of linguistic expression they entail were some kind of gate-keeping to the advancement of a philosophical career. We must never loose sight that philosophy is heavily sociologically conditioned.  Fake scepticism does bear resemblance to certain negative aspects of medieval scholasticism in so far as it might claim to be pure philosophy rather than philosophy in service of theology.  Also it is easy to claim to be 'precise' and 'analytic' when 90 percent of all questions have already been settled and agreed upon and one can engage in mere twig tweaking and leaf niggling - a mere exercise in exegesis in an unquestionably venerated authoritative historical text. In the middle ages there was very scarce direct critical engagement with Aristotle, rather there mere exegesis involving fine-grained distinctions designed to save Aristotle from himself or to reconcile him with blatantly contradictory theological premises.  

Someone may retort: this is not true, look at all the variety and dissent and difference of views in contemporary philosophy ! We live in a climate similar to that of ancient Greece, every conceivable view is represented; contemporary 'analytic philosophy' is eclectic and pluralist, gone are those dogmatic and sterile heydays !  This raises the question: what standard, what criteria should be used then to settle this debate ? How do we judge which view is correct ?  But for the present we must be content to remark:  Frege and Husserl developed extensive and finely articulated arguments for certain philosophical positions.  Why are these views and their arguments not more studied, analyzed, developed or critically engaged in by contemporary philosophy in the midst of the sea of  proponents of clearly contradictory positions ? So either Frege and Husserl's positions and arguments are so bad and weak that they simply do not merit consideration at all, or else our main contention concerning dogmatic fake skepticism is correct.