It seems dubious, in general. For people do not in general debate whether a certain expression S should or should not be assigned to a certain meaning M or reference O , save for philological reasons such as in the Cratylus, etc. Even then it is assumed that M and O have been correctly agreed upon and fixed by shared vocabulary. There could be a dispute among lexicographers about what meaning a given linguistic community assigns to a given expression or whether a proposed definiens is apt. But this is not normative, or only secondarily in the sense that a speaker is then bound to conform to 'correct use'. The idea of a merely verbal dispute has its origins, perhaps, in legal disputes, quid juris and quid facti. Thus is X A ? can be seen as a debate either about facts or about the correctness of the correspondence of the facts with a legal deduction and definition. But is does not seem very interesting if a common legal definition of A is not agreed upon. Rather the debate will involve details of deduction both legal and factual. Or else the definition can be meta-legal about proposals of new definitions, which is fine. But the intention being thus, there is nothing metalinguistic here.
Arguing for logical realism and discussing the logical structure and constitution of the world.
Non omnes formulae significant quantitatem, et infiniti modi calculandi excogitari possunt. (Leibniz)
Sunday, March 17, 2024
Is there really such a thing as a merely verbal dispute ?
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